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RESTITUTION
limitations, and the situation. Restitution is a
creative, not a mathematical, process.
Instance. In Evansville, Ind., teenagers saw
a newspaper ad requesting public backing for
pay raises, and picketed City Hall, demanding
better pay for the police. They explained that
"Some of us have been giving the police trouble.
We saw the ad and thought we'd switch sides."
In Seattle, Wash., a teen-age boy stopped to
change a flat tire for a woman, and declined pay.
"He said he wants to combat the bad publicity
teen-agers get."
Although restitution is a voluntary act, an
offender needs guidance. His initial thinking is in
terms of avoiding or of enduring punishment, and
of vengence. His understanding of what is involved
in restitution will not grow overnight. Like repara-
tions, restitution is appropriately used in connec-
tion with probation. Only a skillful guide can
encourage a man to go a second mile. I suspect
that the best guide is a man who has himself gone
through it
A man who, as a result of guidance, finds the
zestful satisfaction which comes from creative
restitution will continue this process. On the other
hind, sometimes an offender who is told that by
suffering punishment or paying reparations he
pays his -debt to society and to his victim, feels
that the score is now even, so that he is free to
commit further offenses. Restitution, unlike
punishment and reparations, is for life. It may
erase stigma.
Instance. Tip paid his debt to society with 10
years in prison. During his last year, he dis-
covered Alcoholics Anonymous and religion.
While on parole, and with the writer's help, Tip
founded Youth Anonymous, a self-help program
for juvenile delinquents and youthful offenders.
Working a 40-hour week as a truck-driver, he
devoted evenings and week-ends to this youth
work, paying expenses from his own pocket.
The Detroit Commission on Children and Youth
has nominated Tip for a Marshall Field Award.
In La Crosse, Wisconsin, Adults Anonymous,
with leadership similar to that of Youth Anony-
mous, meets weekly in the county jail.
Because restitution is a voluntary, creative.
life-long task, it is a growth process. In terms of
psychological principles of learning, a life-long
program of restitutional behavior may be a
counter-habit to impulsivity.
RESTITUTION CAN BE A GROUP PROCESS
In punishment, a man stands alone. But restitu-
tion is a creative act, and the way is open for group
discussion, which is more creative than one man's
ingenuity. If several youth have committed similar
offenses, they can discuss among themselves, pos-
sibly with the victims of their offenses, appropriate
restitutional measures for each of them to take.
This doesn't mean all would make the same
restitution. The group does not impose any
particular restitutional step upon any individual
in the group, any more than authority can impose
restitutional steps upon an individual. The group
can only stimulate, suggest, support, and guide.
Because restitution can be a group process, time
demands on leadership, e.g., on probation officers,
can be reduced. Group probation seems especially
appropriate when probation is seen as an op-
portunity for guided restitution. Probationary
guidance may be easier with a group than with an
individual. In committing an offense, what a youth
would not do alone he tackles when supported by
his group. In making restitution, what a youth
could not do alone he may tackle with the support
of his group.
A form of restitution always available, whether
one has committed an offense, or has inflicted
accidental damage, or has himself suffered a wrong
either from others or from fate, is to seek out and
to help others in the same boat. Out of this seeking
and sharing, fellowship develops.
Instance. Alcoholics Anonymous, as part of
its 12-step program of continuing personal
growth, includes a willingness to seek out those
persons whom the alcoholic has hurt, and to
make amends to them. Another aspect of
restitution in the AA program is the alcoholic's
willingness, day or night, to inconvenience him-
self in order to bring this program to another
alcoholic.
SEMANTICS
Friendly critics have suggested that, in place of
borrowing an old term like restitution for a new
process--pouring new wine into old bottles?-,
it might be better to find another term. One term
suggested is restoration. Another is redeeming or
redemption. I can see the semantic problem, but I
have no satisfactory solution to offer. My own
preference is to use restitution in this broader
sense, and to use reparations or indemnity for the




Restitution is a form of psychological exercise,
building the muscles of t'3 self, developing a
healthy ego. One man's opinion!
In the behavior disorders (alcoholism, delin-
quency, addiction, perversion, etc.), the goal of
any rehabilitation program is to strengthen the
ego, to build self-control and judgment, and to help
an impulse neurotic to find constructive channels
of self-expression. Skillful guidance towards restitu-
tional behavior may accomplish this goal. Similar
guidance has proven effective in breaking "fixated"
behavior in laboratory animals subjected to stress
(Maier). While punishment can increase fear-
motivation, guidance and restitution increase the
capacity for choice and thus may bring release to
an impulse-ridden individual.
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EQUITABLE DEVICES FOR CONTROLLING ORGANIZED VICE
JAY OLIFF
The prevalence of gambling establishments,
houses of prostitution and other forms of organized
vice in many communities is evidence of the in-
adequacy of the criminal laws. Among the reasons
for this inadequacy are that nominal penalties are
imposed by the criminal statutes; that the penal
laws only punish for past activities and do not
prevent their recurrence; that obtaining sufficient
evidence for a conviction is often frustrated by
the prohibition against illegal search and seizure,
and that the owner of the premises cannot be
prosecuted unless he intentionally leased the
premises for unlawful purposes.' In order to avoid
these difficulties, an alternative remedy involving
a civil action in equity to enjoin the unlawful
activities may be available. Such an action has
certain important advantages. Some stem from
the fact that it is a civil rather than b. criminal
proceeding and others from the nature of the re-
lief which equity can grant. An understanding of
these advantages requires an examination of the
nature of equitable jurisdiction and the relief
which equity may afford.
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES
It is recognized that the civil courts can neither
punish violations of the criminal laws nor enjoin
the commission of crimes.2 However, it is also
recognized that one whose rights have been injured
by another's conduct is entitled to damages in a
civil action, despite the fact that the conduct
may also be subject to criminal sanction.3 Further-
more, the state, as well as a private individual, may
be entitled to relief in a civil action when its inter-
ests are involved 4 Thus, a civil as well as a criminal
remedy may be available against the operators of a
gambling establishment or house of prostitution.
I See BAKER, An Equitable Remedy to Combat Gam-
bling in Illinois, 28 CH-KENT L. Rxv. 287, 287-290
(1950).
2 1 STORY, EQUITy JURISPRUDENCE, §3 n.1 (14th ed.,
1918); CALDWELL, Injunctions Against Crime, 26
ILL. L. REv. 259 (1931).
3 CALDWELL, Injunctions Against Crime, 26 ILL.
L. REv. 259 (1931).
4 Id. at 260.
Although the claimant may be entitled to
damages in a court of law, there are many situa-
tions where a money judgment will not com-
pletely vindicate his rights or interests. Such
situations arise where serious injury will occur
before a court of law can act or where the defend-
ant's activities involve a continuous course of
conduct.' With respect to the latter case, a legal
remedy can compensate only for past injury and
can neither directly abate the defendant's conduct
nor compensate for future injuries.6 It has been
held that equity may offer relief in these situations
despite the fact that the conduct complained of is
also subject to criminal sanctions. 7 Thus, the fact
that certain activities are crimes does not preclude
equitable relief. However, equity requires that
certain conditions be satisfied before it will act.
REQUIREMNTS FOR EQUITABLE JURISDICTION
Before equity will accept jurisdiction, the fol-
lowing pre-requisites must be established: (a)
5 See JOYCE, LAW or NUIsANcEs, §§415, 416 (1906).
6Ibid.
7 In actions by the state, equitable relief has been
granted against Criminal conduct that interferes
with its proprietary interests. Coosaw Mining Co. v.
South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550 (1891) (Injunction
against the unlawful taking of rock from the bed of a
navigable river); Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria
Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91 (1838) (obstruction of
navigable stream); People v. Truckee Lumber Co.,
116 Cal. 397, 48 Pac. 374 (1897) (Unlawful destruction
of fish in the streams of the state); that interferes
with the property rights of a number of its citizens,
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)
(enjoined Corporation from discharging gases which
destroyed crops and orchards in the vicinity of its
plant); Ex Parte Wood, 194 Cal. App. 49, 227 Pac.
908 (1924) (enjoined defendant from recruiting mem-
bers for organization which advocated the abolition
of private property); or that are dangerous to the
public health, People v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14
N.E.2d. 439 (1938) (practice of medicine without a
license); or which constitutes ultra-vires acts of domestic
corporations, Fair Grounds Assoc. v. People, 60 Ill.
App. 488 (1895) (enjoined operation of parimutuel
system by corporation chartered for operation of race
track); Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 143 Ind. 98,
40 N.E. 914 (1895) (enjoined use of corporation's
property for a prize fight); Attorney General v. Jamaica
Park Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (1881) (enjoined
corporation from lowering the water level of a public
pond below legal limits). See also 2 STORY, EQUITY
JURisPRUDENCE, §1251 (14th ed. 1918).
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the conduct complained of must be of a type which
equity will enjoin; (b) the claimant must have an
interest which equity will protect; (c) the remedy
at law must be inadequat,; and (d) the party
seeking relief must have a standing to war.-at
protection.
Conduct enjoinable.-The type of conduct that
equity will enjoin usually involves a continuous
use of property that is offensive to others.8 This
type of conduct is generally termed a nuisance.
Although the term "nuisance" is difficult to de-
fine,"' it does include, at common law, buildings
devoted to gambling and prostitution." Since
gambling houses and brothels were public nuisances
per se at common law, it has been held that the
claimant only has to prove the existence of these
establishments in order to satisfy this require-
ment.1 2 Although injunctions against gambling
and prostitution as such have been held to con-
travene the policy against enjoining the com-
mission of a crime,u injunctions against the use of a
specific piece of property for these unlawful
purposes have been held to be a proper function
of equity jurisdiction4
s CALD ELL, Injunctions Against Crime, 26 ILL.
LAW REv. 259, 271-272 (1931).
9 See JOYCE, LAW OF NUISANCES, §11 (1906).
10 Id. §1.
n Independent of any statute, the keeping of a
common gaming house was at common law indictable
as a public nuisance per se because of its tendency to
bring together disorderly persons, promote immorality
and lead to breaches of the peace. United States v.
Dixon, 25 Fed. Cas. 872, No. 14, 970 (C.C.D.C. 1830);
Vandeworker v. State, 13 Ark. 700 (1850); Thrower v.
State, 49 N.J.L. 471, 9 At. 681 (1887) King v. Dixon,
10 Med. 335, 88 Eng. Rep. 753 (K.B. 1692); King v.
Medler, 2 Shower 36, 89 Eng. Rep. 777 (K.B. 1678).
a bawdy house was also a public nuisance at common
law. See e.g. Smith v. Commonwealth, 45 KY. 21 (1845).
A nuisance per se has been defined as follows:
"A nuisance per se, as the term implies, is a nuisance
in itself, and which, therefore, cannot be so conducted
or maintained as to be lawfully permitted to exist.
Such a nuisance is a disorderly house...." JoYcE,
LAW OF NUiSANCES, §12 (1906).
12 See State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 So. 71 (1918)
(bawdy house); City of Sterling v. Speroni, 336 I11.
App. 590, 84 N.E. 2d 667 (gambling house); Respass v.
Commonwealth, 131 Ky 807, 115 S.W. 1131 (1909)
(gambling house).
13 See People v. Fritz, 316 Ill. App. 217, 45 N.E.
2d 48 (1942) (gambling); Weidner v. Friedman, 126
renn. 677, 151 S.W. 56 (1912) (prostitution). However,
n several instances where the use of property was not
nvolved, the courts have directly enjoined criminal
ictivities. See e.g. State v. Mahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280
?ac. 906 (1929) (usury); People v. Laman, 277 N.Y.
68, 14 N.E.2d. 439 (1938) (practice of medicine with-
out a license).
"See, BAxER, An Equitable Remedy To Combat
(;ambling In Illinois, 28 CHI-KENT L. REv. 287,
298-300 (1950).
Interests protected.-In several cases, the fact
that the defendant was responsible for main-
taining a public nuisance has been held not to be
of itself a sufficient basis for the issuance of an
injunction. These decisions have been largely
based upon the fact that in leading English cases,
an injunction was granted only where some injury
to the property of the claimant was involved."
The courts that follow this view will enjoin the
operation of a gambling or bawdy house which
interferes with the use of the claimant's property. 6
16Attorney General v. Richards, 2 Anst. 603, 145
Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1794) (Ordered removal of build-
ings and docks that obstructed use of harbors); Baines
v. Baker, 1 Amb. 158, 27 Eng. Rep. 105 (Ex. 1752)
(Plaintiff sought to enjoin construction of a small-
pox hospital, alleging that it would destroy the value
of his property in the vicinity. The court denied relief,
holding that if the hospital would be a nuisance it
would be a public nuisance and the proper method
of abatement would be a suit in the name of the at-
torney general); Mayor of London v. Bolt, 5 Ves. 129,
31 Eng. Rep. 507 (Ex. 1799) (Suit to enjoin defendant
from storing sugar in such a manner that the ware-
houses were in danger of collapse. The court held that
equity will not abate an existing nuisance, but will
restrain the defendant from doing anything in the
future which will result in a public nuisance endanger-
ing the public safety); Attorney General v. Cleaver,
18 Ves. 211, 34 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ex. 1911) (Suit to en-join the manufacture of soap in a manner that was
offensive to the health and comfort of the community.
Trial at law was ordered to determine whether the
defendant's activities constituted a nuisance).
In Attorney-General v. Utica Insurance Co., 1 N.Y.
Ch. Rep. 412, 2 Johns Ch. 370 (1817), the court refused
to enjoin an insurance company from issuing bank
notes in violation of its corporate franchise on the
grounds that it was not shown that the available legal
remedies were inadequate and that no immediate
harm was threatened by the defendant's conduct.
However, after interpreting the above English cases,
Chancellor Kent went on to deliver the following
dictum: ".... (B)ut it is an extremely rare case,
and may be considered, if it even happened, as an
anomaly, for a court of equity to interfere at all, and
much less preliminary by injunction, to put down a
public nuisance which did not violate the rights of
property, but only contravened the general policy."
1 N.Y. Ch. Rep. 412, 417, 2 Johns Ch. 370, 380. Sub-
sequent cases have cited this dictum as authority
for the view that the jurisdiction of equity is limited
to the vindication of property rights.
16 Courts of equity have enjoined the operation of
houses of prostitution in suits by owners of neighboring
property; Tedesiki v. Berger, 150 Ala. 649, 43 So. 960
(1927); Crauford %,. Tyrrell, 128 N.Y. 341, 28 N.E.
514 (1891); Blagen v. Smith, 34 Or. 394, 56 Pac. 292(1899); Weakley v. Page, 102 Tenn. 178, 53 S.W.
551 (1899); Dempsie v. Darling, 39 Wash. 125, 81
Pac. 152 (1905); Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 35 Wash.
92, 76 Pac. 513 (1904); Contra, Neafv. Palmer, 103 Ky.
496, 45 S.W. 506 (1898). Operations of a gambling
house have been enjoined where it was shown that it
caused a depreciation in the value of property in its
vicinity. See e.g., People r. Celia, 112 Ill. App. 376(1904). In addition, criminal activities have been en-joined in suits by the state when they constituted
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However, where no ascertainable injury to prop-
erty is shown, the fact that the illegal establish-
ment corrupts the general welfare and morals of
the community has been held to be an insufficient
basis for equitable relief. 17 Other courts have
objected to an extension of equitable jurisdiction
to cases involving no ascertainable injury to the
property rights of the claimant on the additional
grounds that such an extension would interfere
with the jurisdiction of the criminal courts or with
the defendant's right to a trial by jury. 8
Several courts, however, refused to adopt the
view that the jurisdiction of equity was confined to
the vindication of particular rights or interests
and have granted relief where a nuisance was
shown to exist for which there was no adequate
remedy at law despite absence of injury to prop-
erty rights. These courts maintained that the
jurisdiction of equity should be sufficiently flexible
ultra-vires acts of its domestic corporations; Fair
Grounds Assoc. v. People, 60 Ill. App. 488 (1895)(operation of parimutuel system); Columbian Athletic
Club v. State, 143 Ind. 98, 40 N.E. 914 (1895) (illegal
prize fight).
'7 See State v. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117, 98 S.W. 685
(1906) (gambling house); People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d.
872, 118 P.2d. 472 (1941) (gambling house); People v.
Condon 102 Ill. App. 449 (1902) (illegal race track);
State v. O'Leary, 155 Ind. 526, 58 N.E. 703 (1900)
(gambling house); Commonwealth v. Stratton Finance
Co. 310 Mass. 469, 38 N.E.2d 640 (1941) (operation
of "loan shark" business); State v. Uhrig, 14 mo. App.
413 (1883) (illegal sale of liquor); State v. Patterson,
14 Tex. Civ. App. 465, 37 S.W. 478 (1896) (gambling
houses); State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S.E. 934(1909) (gambling house). However, in some cases
jurisdiction was accepted by a liberal interpretation
of the requirement of injury to property rights. See,
e.g., Stead v. Fortner, 171 111. App. 161 (1912) (Re-
quirement of effect on property rights satisfied by
allegation that defendant used his property to violate
the state liquor laws and no damage to the property
of others need be shown. Appears to have overruled
People v Condt, supra); People v. Cella, 112 Ill.
App. 376 (1904) (requirement satisfied by allegation
that the citizens would be forced to abandon their
property and leave the community if operation of
gambling house was not enjoined).
18 In State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S.V. 934
(1909) after discussing the lack of precedent for the
abatement of a gambling house where no injury to
property was shown, the court went on to hold that
if the general welfare and morals were made a subject
of equitable jurisdiction, the jurisdictional boundaries
between the courts of law and of equity would be
obliterated.
In People v. Lrn, 18 Cal2d 872, 118 P. 2d 472 (1941)
the court, in refusing to enjoin the operation of a
gambling house, held that because the defendant
would be deprived of a trial by jury and of the inherent
safeguards of the criminal procedures, the expansion
of the subject matter of equity jurisdiction should be
left to the legislature. See also Commonwealth v. Strat-
ton Finance Co., 310 Mass. 469, 38 N.E.2d 640 (1941).
to meet new situations. 19 In cases where the state
is the complainant, this liberal view has been
justified upon the theory that the interest of the
state in protecting the general welfare of its citizens
is a proper subject of equitable jurisdiction.2
Therefore, where this view is followed, the state
should have no difficulty in establishing a sufficient
interest for equitable protection in cases involving
activities such as gambling or prostitution that
are nuisances per se at common law. The later
cases, involving criminal nuisances, reveal a
trend towards the liberal view2' and evidence the
"In State v. Mayor of Mobile, 5 Porter (Ala.) 279
(1837), the court held that the dictum of Chancellor
Kent in Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co.,
I N.Y. Ch. Rep. 412, 2 Johns, Ch 370 (1817) was not
a correct interpretation of the law and enjoined the
erection of a building in the middle of a street that was
part of a public highway despite the fact that there
was no proof of how anybody's property would be in-
jured.
In CALDWELL, Injunction Against Crime, 26 ILL.
L. REv. 259 (1931), after an analysis of the cases cited
by Kent in support of his dicta (note 15, supra), the
author concluded that they are not authorities for
limiting the jurisdiction of equity to property rights.
Caldwell points out that although the only case in
which an injunction was granted involved an inter-
ference with the property of the crown, Attorney General
v. Richards, 2 Anst. 603, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1794),
the other cases were dismissed not because of a failure
to show any injury to property, but because the action
was not brought by the proper party, Baines v. Baker,
1 Amb. 158, 27 Eng. Rep. 105 (Ex. 1752); the remedy
at law was inadequate, Mayor of London v. Bolt, 5
Ves. 129, 31 Eng. Rep. 507 (Ex. 1799); or the existence
of a nuisance was not established, Attorney General v.
Cleaver, 18 Ves. 211, 34 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ex. 1811).
20 In the case of In Re Debs 158 U.S. 564 (1894),
after concluding that the property rights of the federal
government in its official mails was a sufficient basis
for the issuance of an injunction against a railroad strike
that interferred with the movement of the mails, the
United States Supreme Court went on to say: "We
do not care to place our decision upon this ground alone.
Every government, interested by the very terms of its
being, with powers and duties to be exercised and dis-
charged for the general welfare, has a right to apply to
its own courts for any proper assistance in the exercise
of the one and the discharge of the other, and it is Pt
sufficient answer to its appeal to one of these courts that
it has no pecuniary interest in the matter. The obligation
which it is under to promote the interest (f all, and to
prevent the wrong doing of one reslting in injury to
the general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give it a
standing in court." (Emphasis Supplied) at 158 U.S.
584. This case frequently has been cited as the authority
for the liberal view.
21 In the following cases criminal activities were
enjoined, despite the fact that no injury to property
was shown, on the grounds that they were harmful to
the general welfare of the community. State r. Ellis,
201 Ala 295, 78 So. 71 (1918) (bawdy house); fartin
v. Copeland 145 Ga. 399, 89 S.E. 333 t1916) kbawdy
house); Brindle v. Copeland 145 Ga. 398, 89 S.E.
332 (1916) (bawdy house); City of Sterling v. Sporoni,
336 Ill. App. 590, 84 N.E. 2d 667 (1949) (gambling
house); State v. Brush. 318 Ill. 307, 149 -N.E. 262 (1925)
19581
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abandonment of the view that equitable jurisdic-
tion is confined to the protection of property
rights.2
Inadequacy of remedy at law.-Apart from the
nature of the interests that equity will protect, he
problem remains of whether the remedy at law is
inadequate. Generally, in order to obtain equitable
relief, the claimant must show that his injuries
result from a continuous course of conduct which
cannot be suppressed by the ordinary legal proc-
esses.n Where criminal activities are involved,
there may be the additional problems of the extent
to which the claimant must first resort to the
criminal remedies.
In regard to criminal activities, equitable
jurisdiction may be invoked either on the ground
that the plaintiff will suffer serious injury before
the criminal processes can be put in motion or on
the basis that because of the continuous nature of
the conduct in question, it cannot be suppressed
by a conviction in the criminal courts.2 Under
(illegal sale of liquor); People v. Clark, 268 Ill. 156,
108 N.E. 944 (1915) (bawdy house); State v. Hines,
178 Kans. 42, 283 P.2d 472 (1955) (illegal sale of
liquor); Respass v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 807, 115
S.W. 1131 (1909) (gambling house); Commonwealth v.
McGovern, 116 Ky 237, 75 S.W. 261 (1903) (enjoined
owner from permitting prize fight on property);
State v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078 (1908)
(bull fight); State v. Ark-Sar-Ben Exposition Cod.,
121 Neb. 248, 236 N.W. 736 (1931) (pari-mutuel sys-
tem); Balch v. State, 65 Oka 146, 164 Pac 776 (1917)
(bawdy house). See also Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123,
110 A.2d 383 (1955) (Enjoined operators of recreation
park from refusing to admit plaintiffs because of race.
Pointed out that there is a progressive tendency on
part of courts to abandon view that equitable jurisdic-
tion is confined to property rights and to grant in-junctions to remedy injuries to personal rights.)
2 Compare State v. Uhrig, 14 Mo. App. 413 (1883),
where the court refused to enjoin operation of illegal
tavern because no injury to property was involved
with State v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078 (1908),
where bull fight was enjoined because it was harmful to
general welfare. For a similar situation in the Illinois
courts compare People v. Condon, 102 Ill. App. 161
(1912) with City of Sterling v. Speroni, 336 Ill. App.
590, 84 N.E 2d 667 (1949).
2 See JoYcE, LAW OF NuisNcEs, §§415, 416 (1906).
24 "The ground of this jurisdiction of Courts of Equity
in cases of purpesture as well as of public nuisances
undoubtedly is their ability to give a more complete
and perfect remedy than is attainable at law, in order
to prevent irreparable mischief and also to suppress
oppressive and vexatious litigation. In the first place,
they can interpose where the Courts of Law cannot,
to restrain and prevent such nuisances as are threatened
or are in progress, as well as to abate those already
existing. In the next place, by a perpetual injunction
the remedy is made complete through all future time;
whereas an information or indictment at the common
law can only dispose of the present nuisance, and for
the former theory, since a showing that the crimi-
nal processes cannot be put in motion in sufficient
time to prevent serious injury to the plaintiff
establishes the inadequacy of the criminal reme-
dies, no prior attempt at prosecution is needed.
This theory has been applied where a gambling
house or brothel interfered with the use and enjoy-
ment of property 25 However, the cases in which
relief was granted upon this theory generally
involved some measurable damage to the claim-
ant's property or the threat of physical violence.2 6
Since in most instances gambling and prosti-
tution do not cause any ascertainable injury to the
complainant's property, the critical objection to
these activities is their adverse effect upon the
public moralsY Therefore, in most cases involving
gambling houses and brothels, the jurisdiction of
equity is predicated upon the theory that the
defendant's conduct cannot be suppressed by the
criminal laws.28 Under this theory some experience
with the criminal laws is usually required." How-
future acts new prosecutions must be brought. In the
next place the remedial justice in equity may be prompt
and immediate before irreparable mischief is done;
whereas at law nothing can be done except after a trial,
and upon the award of judgment ... ." 2 STORY, EQuzrit
JuaIsPRuDENcE, §1251 (14th ed. 1918).
21 An owner whose property has been injured by
the existence of a bawdy house may have its operation
enjoined as a private nuisance without a prior attempt
at invoking the criminal processes. See Tedesiki v.
Berger, 150 Ala. 649, 43 So. 960 (1907); Cranford v.
Tyrrell, 128 N.Y. 341, 28 N.E. 514 (1891); Weakley v.
Page, 102 Tenn. 178, 53 S.W. 551 (1899); Ingersoll v.
Rousseau, 35 Wash. 92, 76 Pac. 513 (1904).
26 In cases involving illegal public exhibitions such
as prize fights, it has been held that equity may inter-
vene because the criminal courts cannot prevent the
serious mischief that would result from the large as-
sembly of disorderly persons that would be attracted
by the fight. See e.g. Commonwealth v. McGovern,
116 KY. 237, 75 S.W. 261 (1903); State v. Canty, 207
Mo. 439, 105 S. W. 1078 (1908).
At common law gambling houses and brothels were
public nuisances because of their tendency to promote
immorality and lead to breaches of the peace. See
cases cited in note 11, supra.
28 "As we have noted above, this court has never
regarded a criminal prosecution, which can only dispose
of an existing nuisance and cannot prevent a renewal of
the nuisance, for which a new prosecution must be
brought, as a complete and adequate remedy for a
wrong inflicted on the public." Stead v. Fortner, 255
Ill. 468, 477, 99 N.E. 680, 683 (1912) (illegal sale of
liquor).
29 Where the general welfare and morals were the
only interest involved, the courts have refused equitable
relief where no effort was made to suppress the nuisance
by the criminal processes. See e.g., People v. Fritz,
316 Ill. App. 217, 45 N.E. 2d 48 (1942) (gambling
house); State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 726 (1882) (illegal
saloon).
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ever, there is no general rule governing the extent
to which the claimant must have exhausted the
criminal processes before resorting to equity.
Injunctions have been granted where the inade-
quacy of the criminal penalties was shown by the
fact that prior convictions failed to discourage the
operation of a gaming house or brothel.30 In addi-
tion, equitable jurisdiction may be available where
the enforcement of the criminal laws is inade-
quate because of the failure of the law enforcement
officials to take action 2 or because it is easy for the
proprietors of a gambling house to leave the
jurisdiction when threatened with an arrest.
Furthermore, injunctions have been granted
despite the fact that the defendant was acquitted
in a criminal action. Equity, then, is particularly
useful in regard to gambling and prostitution where
both the nominal penalties provided by the crimi-
nal laws and the non-enforcement of the laws are
a source of difficulty.
Party who may bring action -The use of equity
for the abatement of criminal activities as public
nuisances is limited by the requirement that the
action be initiated on behalf of the state by a
legal officer, rather than by a private individual.
This requirement prevents the institution of more
than one siiit for the abatement of a specific nui-
sance, which might occur if any private citizen
were allowed to initiate an action." Because of this
requirement, if the attorney general or prosecuting
attorney refuses to initiate action the criminal
elements are usually protected from an injunction
as well as a criminal prosecution.
A private citizen cannot sue unless he can show
special damage, in addition to that suffered by the
public at large.3 5 In suits by private citizens, the
" See City of Sterling v. Speroni, 336 Ill. App. 590,
84 N.E. 994 (1915); Respass v. Commonwealth, 131
Ky. 807, 115 S.W. 1131 (1909).
' See Stead v. Forther, 255 Ill. 468,99 N.E. 680 (1912)
(illegal sale of liquor); State v. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117,
98 S.W. 685 (1906).
n E.g., People v. Cella, 112 Il. App. 376 (1904).
n E.g., State v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078
(1908).
4Statutes authorizing suits by private citizens on
behalf of the state, to abate the-operation of a bawdy
house, have been upheld. The decisions pointed out that
the purpose of the rule against suits by private in-
dividuals was to prevent a multiplicity of suits. How-
ever, they went on to hold that the rule was a matter
of legislative policy and, therefore, it was within the
discretion of the legislature to change the rule. E.g.
People. v. Casa Co., 35 Cal. App. 194, 169 Pac. 454
(1917); People v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N.E. 31 (1916).
"1 See e.g. Redway v. Moore, 3 Idaho 312, 29 Pac.
104 (1892) (bawdy house); this rule has been applied
requirement of "special damage" has generally
been interpreted as an interference with the use
and enjoyment of the owner's property.36 However,
in addition to property rights, recent cases exhibit
a trend towards granting relief where the illegal
conduct interferes with a personal right of the
citizensi. Thus, if a gambling establishment or
brothel is located in a populated area and its
operation causes a depreciation in the value of
neighboring property, it may be enjoined by the
owner of the neighboring property. However,
equity will not grant relief to a private citizen
merely because gambling and prostitution are
contrary to his moral concepts3 8 Since the state
must initiate an action to vindicate the public
morals, its refusal to act will protect a criminal
nuisance from an injunction unless it directly
interferes with the use and enjoyment of the prop-
erty of a private citizen 9
EvmENTIAL AND PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES
Since a suit in equity is a civil proceeding, it has
strong procedural and evidentiary advantages over
a criminal prosecution. For example, because the
action may be initiated by the filing of a bill with
the court, there is no necessity for an arrest or
other intervention by the law enforcement officials.
An equitable proceeding can be an effective means
despite the fact that the law enforcement officials
refused to take action. People v. District Court, 26
'Colo. 386, 58 Pac. 604 (1899) (gambling). In Koch v.
Mcblugage, 276 11. App. 512 (1934), it was held that a
wife's right to support and maintenance would not
entitle her to an injunction against a gambling house
in which her husband had been losing large sums of
money.
16 See cases cited in note 16, supra. Furthermore, in a
few cases the courts granted equitable relief by re-
sorting to a liberal interpretation of the concelbt of
property rights. See Herald v. Glendale Lodge, 46
Cal. App. 325, 189 Pac. 329 (1920) (enjoined lodge of
Elks Club from serving beer in violation of city or-
dinance, in a suit by member of lodge. Basis of de-
cision was that practice, if continued, would subject
members to financial loss and social odium). Burden
v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N.E.2d 59 (1956) (Chiro-
practer held to have sufficient proprietory interest
in license to maintain action to enjoin practice by
unlicensed competitor).
3 See e.g. Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d
383(1955) (enjoined operators of a recreation park from
refusing to admit plaintiff because of his race: Dis-
criminatory practice was prohibited by state penal
laws).
3 See People v. District Court, 26 Colo. 386, 58 Pac.
604(1899).
9 The benefit that a gambling house receives from
a corrupt prosecutor may largely depend upon its
location.
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for circumventing corrupt or apathetic law enforce-
ment officials. Furthermore, after the bill has
been filed, relief may be -rtained almost immedi-
ately by the issuance of a temporary injunction."0
This is significant when contrasted with the tact
that no relief can be obtained in a criminal pro-
ceeding until after a verdict by a jury. Since a
jury is not necessary in an equitable proceeding,
no delays are encountered incident to jury selec-
tion. In addition, the plaintiff, who is usually an
officer of the state, is entitled to an appeal if the
suit is dismissed in the trial court."
In order to be convicted for a crime, one must be
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 For
this reason, the defendant, in a criminal action,
does not have to produce evidence of his innocence
until the state has produced evidence of his guilt.43
In an action in equity, on the other hand, a
temporary injunction may be issued solely upon the
allegations in the bill or complaint.' If the de-
fendant should default or fail to answer as to the
facts, the allegations in the bill may be a sufficient
basis for the issuance of a permanent injunction."
40 State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 So. 71 (1918);
City of Sterling v. Speroni, 336 Ill. App. 590, 84 N.E. 2d
667 (1949) (Temporary injunction against gambling
house issued after notice and hearing, but before the
filing of defendant's answer); People v. Clark, 268 Ill.
156, 108 N.E. 994 (1915) (Temporary injunction
was issued after notice to defendant. Defendant de-
faulted after receiving notice); Peoplev. Cella, 112
Ill. App. 376 (1904) (Temporary injunction was issued
after filing of complaint, but before filing of defendant's
answer); Commonwealth v. McGovern, 116 Ky. 237,
75 S.W. 261 (1903) (Temporary injunction issued
after filing of answer. Based upon allegations in com-
plaint supported by affadavits and depositions);
Balch v. State, 65 Okla. 146, 164 Pac. 776 (1917) (Tem-
porary injunction issued at hearing in chambers, upon
affidavits submitted by various private citizens).
41 See State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 So. 71 (1918)
(bawdy house); Commonwealth v. McGovern, 116 Ky.
237, 75 S.W. 261 (1903) (illegal prize fight); State v.
Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078 (1908) (bullfight).
42 See e.g. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910)
(murder). The burden of proof is the same for serious
crimes as it is for trivial crimes: State v. Johnson,
164 La. 417, 29 So. 24 (1900); State v. Tetrault, 78
N.H. 14, 95 Atl. 699 (1915).
41 Non-action of the defendant in a criminal case
cannot be substituted for action on the part of the state
as to any matter required to be established as part of
the state's case.
"4 See cases cited in note 40 supra.
45 In People v. Clark, 368 Ill. 156, 108 N.E. 994 (1915)
a bill was filed alleging that the defendant operated
a bawdy house and praying that the operation of the
house be enjoined. The allegations in the bill were
supported by two affidavits. Upon the default of the
defendant the court issued a permanent injunction.
Later, in an action for contempt based on a violation
Df the injunction, the Supreme Court of Illinois held
Those who are responsible for the operation of
gambling establishments must either admit or
deny their deeds. They cannot remain silent and
merely wait for the state to come forward with
evidence.
In contrast to the criminal action, the plaintiff in
an equitable proceeding need only prove his allega-
tions by a preponderance of the evidence.16 The
plaintiff's burden of proof is further facilitated by
the fact that a court of equity may consider the
general reputation of the premises in question, as
evidence of its character as a nuisanceY Further-
more, if the defendant should refuse to submit to
cross-examination, the court may consider this
fact in weighing the evidence.48
that the defendant's failure to answer the allegations
in the bill stopped her from questioning the sufficiency
of the evidence or the regularity of the proceedings
in the original suit for the injunction.
In the following cases, the defendant did not answer
to the facts alleged in the complaint, but filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the suit was unlawful.
Upon dismissal of the defendant's motion, the court
issued an injunction against him upon the allegations
in the complaint and without the presentation of any
evidence. Fulton v. State, 171 Ala. 572, 54 So. 688
(1911) (illegal sale of liquor); People v. Smith, 275 Ill.
256, 114 N.E. 311 (1916) (bawdy house); Stead v.
Fortner, 255 Il1. 468, 99 N.E. 680 (1912) (Illegal sale of
liquor); Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W. 641
(1885); Carleton v. Rugg, 19 Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55(1889) (bawdy house).
16 In a suit to abate a criminal nuisance the ordinary
civil procedures in equity are applicable, which means
that the allegations of the bill or complaint can be
sustained by a mere preponderance of the evidence.
See e.g. Davis v. Auld, 96 Me. 559, 53 At. 118 (1902)
(Action to abate illegal saloon).
17 Where a suit in equity to abate a criminal nuisance
is authorized by statute, such statute may contain
provisions to the effect that the general reputation of
the premises shall be admissible for purposes of prov-
ing the existence of the nuisance. See e.g. "Redlight
Abatement Law", CAL. PEN. CoDE, §11228 (Supp.
1956); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN., c. 39, Art. 15, §4
(Supp. 1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 100Y2 , §3 (Supp.
1956); MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 139, §9 (Supp. 1955).
A decree pursuant to a statute and substantially based
upon evidence as to the general reputation of the prem-
ises was sustained in Gregg v. People, 65 Col. 390,
176 Pac. 483 (1918). However, even in the absence
of a statute, the general reputation of the defendant's
premises has been held to be sufficient proof of his
illegal activities. See e.g. Balch v. State, 65 Okla. 146,
164 Pac. 776 (1917).
48 In Davis v. Auld, 96 Me. 559, 53 Atl. 118 (1902),
the court refused to set aside a decree on the grounds
of insufficiency of evidence. The court held that a
decree should not be set aside unless the findings
as to the maintenance of the nuisance (illegal sale of
liquor) were clearly wrong and the existence of unex-
plained suspicious circumstances and the fact that the
defendants refrained from placing themselves under
f[Vol. 48
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In addition, securing evidence of gambling that
is admissible in a criminal trial is often difficult
because of the prohibition against illegal searches
and seizures.4 9 This prohibition has been held to
be applicable in civil as well as in criminal pro-
ceedings.50 Since the general reputation of the
defendant's premises, however, and his refusal to
submit to cross-examination are admissible as
evidence in equity, it should not be necessary to
introduce eviderice obtained by an illegal search or
seizure. Furthermore, since the prohibition against
illegal searches and seizures is intended as a limita-
tion on the power of the state, it has no application
if the action is initiated by a private citizen.-'
SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION
Once a court of equity decides to grant relief,
further complications arise as to the parties who
may be joined in the decree and as to the extent
to which it can abate the illegal activities. These
limitations arise from the fact that theoretically
equity does not enjoin gambling and prostitution
as such, but enjoins the use of a specific piece of
property for these illegal purposes. 52 Therefore,
although the defendant may be enjoined from using
a certain premises for conducting an unlawful
business, the decree generally can not prohibit
him from conducting the business anywhere within
the jurisdiction of the court.-3 In addition, provi-
cross examination was sufficient to sustain the decree.
This suggests that a defendant in an equitable pro-
ceeding will not benefit from a refusal to testify as to
facts which could be used against him in a subsequent
criminal action.
49 For an example of difficulty in obtaining evidence
for conviction of gambling house proprietor because of
illegal search and seizure rule see People v. Two Roulette
Wheels and Tables, 326 Ill. App. 143, 61 N.E.2d 277
(1945).
50 Illegally seized evidence has been barred in civil
suits by the federal government. See Rogers v. United
States, 97 F2d 691 (Ist Cir. 1938) (Illegally seized liquor
barred as evidence in civil action to recover import
duties thereon).
51 See e.g. Walker v. Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d
316 (1951) (Action for personal injuries arising from
automobile collision. Defendant objected to admission
of uncorked bottle of liquor seized from his car by
plaintiff after the accident).
2 Suits to enjoin gambling or prostitution as such,
and not in connection with a specific piece of property
have generally been dismissed as unlawful attempts to
enforce the criminal laws. See People v. Fritz, 316 Ill.
App. 217, 45 N.E.2d 48 (1942) (gambling); (Weidner v.
Friedman, 126 Tenn. 677, 151 S.W. 56 (1912) (prostitu-
tion).
m Provisions of decrees enjoining the defendants from
engaging in the illegal activities anywhere within thejurisdiction of the court have been set aside as unlaw-
sions of a decree ordering the closing of a building,
rather than prohibiting its illegal use, have been
reversed by appellate courts.-
It also follows from the fact that equity acts only
upon the use of property, that the parties named
in the decree must be confined to those who are
responsible for the condition of the premises.
There is no problem in enjoining the lessee who
operates the illicit enterprise or the owner who
fails to act after receiving notice of the nuisance
on his property.5 However, the courts will not go
beyond this point and make suppliers of essential
goods and services parties to the injunction. Thus,
attempts to reach telegraph companies who supply
essential racing information to horse betting
parlors, printers who print policy tickets, or the
railroads who deliver supplies to gambling houses
have been unsuccessful.5 6
Even with these limitations upon its scope,
the decree of injunction is still an effective device
ful attempts to enforce the criminal laws. State v.
Denny's Place, 98 Ohio App. 351, 129 N.E.2d 532
(1954) (Illegal tavern). Although in City of Sterling r.
Speroni, 336 I1. App. 590, 84 N.E.2d 667 (1949), the
trial court enjoined the defendant from operating a
horse betting parlor anywhere within the jurisdiction
of the court, the scope of the injunction was not placed
in issue or appeal.
54 In the following cases the decrees were modified to
eliminate provisions ordering the padlocking of build-
ings used for prostitution, Brindle v. Copeland, 145 Ga.
398, 89 S.E. 332 (1916); Marlin v. Copeland, 145 Ga.
399, 89 S.E. 333 (1916); Balch v. State, 65 Okla. 146,
164 Pac. 776 (1917).
55 It has been held that notice of a suit in equity to
abate a nuisance on his property is sufficient notice to
the owner. Therefore, if the owner fails to remove the
nuisance after receiving notice of the action, he may
be made a party to the injunction. See Chase v. Proprie-
tor of Rezere House, 232 Mass. 881, 122 N.E. 162 (1919)(bawdy house) State v. Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N.W.
953 (1914) (bawdy house). Held that ignorance due to
negligence is the equivalent of notice and that owner is
presumed to know the business conducted on his
premises); State v. Fanning, 96 Neb. 123, 147 N.W.
215 (1914) (bawdy house). (Held that granting of
temporary injunction was sufficient notice to defendant
owner).
56 In People v. Fritz, 316 Ill. App. 217, 45 N.E.2d 48,
(1942), the court set aside an injunction which had
been issued against 1400 defendants, alleged to have
been responsible for the operation of gambling houses in
the state. Among the defendants were a telegraph com-
pany and other suppliers of essential goods and services
to the illegal establishment. The court felt that the
presence of these defendants showed that the action
was directed against violations of the law generally
and not against the use of specific pieces of property.
In other cases the courts refused to enjoin a brewery
from shipping beer to customers in a "dry" county,
State v. Dick and Bros. Quincy Brewing Co., 270 Mo.
100, 192 S.W. 1022 (1917).
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for the abatement of criminal activities, such as
gambling and prostitution, which depend upon
public patronage and the use of a specific piece of
real property. Because a violation of the injunction
would subject the responsible parties to immediate
punishment for contempt, they may be forceu to
abandon the base of operations which is essential
to the conduct of the illegal enterprise. In addi-
tion, because the action is civil rather than crimi-
nal in nature, the owner of the property can be
joined as a defendant and made a party to the
decree without the necessity of showing that he had
knowledge of the lessee's activities prior to the
initiation of the suit.57 Because a violation of the
injunction by the operator of the unlawful business
would also subject the owner to contempt pro-
ceedings, a duty to abate the gambling or prosti-
tution is thereby placed upon the owner. Further-
more, this duty does not end with the abatement
of the existing nuisance. Since the operation
of the injunction may be perpetual, 58 the owner is
induced to diligently inquire into the motives of
his future tenants and to police his premises after
they have been leased. Furthermore, both the
suit for an injunction and the contempt proceed-
ing for a violation of the injunction have been
upheld against the contention that they constitute
an infringement of the defendant's right to a trial
by jury.5 9
5 See cases cited in note 55, supra.
58 Ladner v. Siegal, 298 Pa. 487, 495, 148 Atl. 699,
701, (1930).
11 The United States Supreme Court in upholding the
constitutionality of a Kansas statute authorizing an
action in equity for the padlocking of buildings in
which liquor was illegally sold, held that the power
conferred by the statute to abate a nuisance without
a trial by jury is in harmony with settled principles
of equity jurisdiction. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
After he had been imprisoned for violating a decree
enjoining him from leading a railroad strike, the
defendant petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a suit of error and a writ of habeas corpus.
The former unit was denied on the grounds that the
order of the circuit court was not a final judgment or
decree. In the case involving the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the court answered the defendant's
claim that his right to a trial by jury had been violated,
as follows: "Nor is there in this any invasion of the
constitutional right of trial by jury .... But the power
of a court to make an order carries with it the equal
power to punish for a disobedience of that order, and
the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has been,
from time immemorial, the special function of the
court. And this is no technical rule. In order that
a court may compel obedience to its orders it must
have the right to inquire whether there has been any
disobedience thereof. To submit the question of dis-
obedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another
In addition to enjoining the owner, a suit in
equity may be a distinct advantage where the
owner of a gambling house or brothel has avoided
the effect of prior convictions by transferring the
title to the premises. 60 A decree may be worded
in such a manner that in addition to ordering the
present owner to abate the nuisance, it may also
order all subsequent parties, claiming under the
owner, not to allow a resumption of the nuisance. 61
ENLARGEMENT OF JURJSDICTION BY STATUTE
Many states have enacted statutes eliminating
common law restriction upon the subject matter of
equitable jurisdiction, the scope of the decree and
the initiation of the suit. These statutes generally
declare that buildings used for activities such as
gambling, prostitution, and the illegal sale of
liquor are public nuisances and may be abated by a
suit in equity. This completely alters the policy of
those courts which insisted upon an interference
with property rights before granting equitable
relief.3 Also, the courts have said that these
statutes constitute a legislative recognition of
the fact that the powers of equity are better
suited than those of the criminal courts for the
court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half
its efficiency. .. ." In Re Debs 158 U.S. 564, 594-595,
600 (1894).
'0 See e.g. Respass v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 807,
115 S.W. 1131 (1909).
" See BAKER, An Equitable Remedy To Combat
Gambling In Illinois, 28 CHI-KENT L. REv. 287, 295(1950).
6 The following state statutes grant to the courts
of equity, the power to enjoin the use of premises
for certain criminal activities. ALA. CODE, tit. 29, §141(1949) (illegal sale of intoxicating liquors); "Redlight
Abatement Law", CAL. PEN. CODE, §11225 (Supp.
1956) (bawdy houses); CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 1, §1 (1935)
(bawdy house); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 100Y2, §1 (Supp.
1956) (bawdy house); IN'D. ANN. STAT. §10-2709.(Supp. 1955) (illegal horse races); IowA CODE ANN.
§128.1 (Supp. 1956) (illegal sale of liquor); KAN. GEN.
STAT. 41-806 (1949) (liquor); ME. REV. STAT. c. 14!,
§1 (Supp. 1955) (gambling, prostitution and illegal
sale of liquor); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 139, §6 (Supp.
1955) (bawdy house); MAss. ANN. LAWS, c. 139,
s.16 (Supp. 1955) (gambling houses); MINN. STAT.
§617.34 (1949) (prostitution); NEB. REV. STAT.
§280911 (1943) (bawdy house); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. to, §§2, 11 (Supp. 1956) (Any public nuisance);
TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4665, 4667 (Supp.
1956) (gambling and prostitution.)
Compare People v. Lim., 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d
472 (1941) (Refused to enjoin operation of gambling
house because of failure to show injury to property) with
People v. Barbiere, 33 Cal. App. 770, 166 Pac. 812(1917) (Suit under statute to abate bawdy house. Re-
lief granted despite failure to allege or prove damages
to property).
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suppression of the nuisance in question." This
makes it unnecessary for the petitioner to show
why the remedy at law is inadequate.
In addition to a suit by the attorney general or
prosecuting attorney, these statutes authorize the
initiation of an action on behalf of the state by
any citizen of the county in which the nuisance is
located, without the necessity for showing a special
injury to his property rights.5 This provides
a convenient means for circumventing the corrupt
prosecutor. Furthermore, not only may the de-
fendant be enjoined from conducting gambling or
prostitution at a specific location, but many
statutes authorize an injunction, that is operative
throughout the state.6
Apart from the removal of technical common
law limitations, these statutes also effectively
increase the powers of equity by providing for
other potent remedies in addition to the injunction.
Unless the owner posts a bond, a court is author-
ized to order the padlocking of a building for a
specified period of time.6 Furthermore, the decree
may order the sheriff to remove and sell all personal
property used in connection with the illegal
"See Clopton v. State, 105 S.W. 994 (Tex. 1907)
(suit under statute to enjoin bawdy house).
6- The statutes cited in note 62, supra, uniformly
provide that in addition to the state legal officers, a
suit can be maintained by a private citizen of the
county without the necessity of showing special dam-
ages.
6 "If the existence of the nuisance is established,
the court shall enter a decree perpetually restraining
all persons from maintaining or permitting such
nuisance, and from using the building or apartment,
or the place in which the same is maintained for any
purpose for a period of one year thereafter ... and
perpetually restraining the defendant from maintain-
ing any such nuisance within the jurisdiction of the
court." (Emphasis supplied). ILL. ANN. STAT. c-1000-
§s5 (Supp. 1956). Most of the other statutes in note 62,
supra have a similar provision.
7 ". ... (A)nd to enjoin the use of such building or
apartment or such place for any purpose for a period
of one year" ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 100/2, §2 (Supp. 1956).
"If the owner of such building or apartment, or
such place shall appear and pay all costs which may
have been assessed, and shall file a bond of not less than
one thousand dollars or more than five thousand dollars,
conditioned that such owner will immediately abate
such nuisance and prevent such nuisance from being
established or maintained therein within a period of
one year thereafter, the court shall vacate such decree
and order of abatement, on such place, and shall also
vacate the order directing the sale of movable prop-
erty. .. ." ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 10 0J/a, §8 (Supp. 1956).
The other statutes cited in note 62, supra, contain
similar provisions.
It has been held that the section pertaining to
the filing of a bond has no application where the
owner of the premises is also the operator of the illegal
business. People v. Marshall, 262 Ill. App. 128 (1931).
activities and turn the proceeds over to the owner
after the deduction for the cost of sale.68 This may
have the effect of complete confiscation of gambling
devices which cannot be used for legitimate pur-
poses. It also has been held that since these
remedies act in rem, or against the property, the
lack of knowledge of the illegal activities on the
part of the owner is no defense. 69 Furthermore, if
the owner of the premises cannot be found, a
decree may be issued without the necessity of
serving the owner with notice of the action. 0
These additional statutory remedies have been
attacked as a taking of property without due
process of law and as punishment for a crime
without a trial by jury. However, such remedies
have been almost uniformly upheldYn It has
been held that the statutes do not authorize the
state to take or to appropriate any property for its
own use since the owner is entitled to regain the
use of his building for legitimate purposes by
posting a bond and any proceeds from the sale of
the personal property is turned over to the owner.72
68 See e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 100/ 2, §5 (Supp. 1956).
69 Although the owner's lack of knowledge may
prevent him from being made a party to the injunction
or being bound for the costs of the action, it will not
prevent the issuance of a closing or removal and sale
order. See People v. Barbiere, 33 Cal. App. 770, 166
Pac. 812 (1917) (bawdy house); State v. Gilbert, 126
Minn. 95, 147 N.W. 953 (1914) (bawdy house).
70 A decree ordering the dosing of a building or
the removal and sale of the furniture and fixtures
cannot be issued if the owner is not joined as a party.
State v. Fanning, 96 Neb. 123, 147 N.W. 215 (1914).
Such a decree, however, may be issued where the owner,
after a diligent search, cannot be found. People v.
Lipschultz, 240 ll. App. 411 (1926). -
7 The case upholding the constitutionality of the
various state statutes are: ALA. CODE, tit. 29 §.141
(1940); Fulton v. State, 171 Ala. 572, 54, So. 688 (1911);
"Redlight Abatement Law," CAL. PEN. CODE §11225
(Supp. 1956), People v. Barbiere, 33 Cal. App. 770, 166
Pac. 812 (1917); CoLo. STAT. ANN. c.1, art. 39 (Sup.
1955); Gregg v. People, 65 CoLo. 399, 176 Pac. 483
(1918); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 10034 §1 (Supp. 1956);
People v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N.E. 31 (1916);
IND. ANN. STAT. §10-2709 (Burns Supp. 1955); State v.
Roby, 142 Ind. 168, 41 N.E. 145 (1895); IOWA CODE
ANN., §128.1 (Supp. 1956); Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa
488,22 N.W. 641 (1885); ME. REv. STAT. c. 146 §1
(Supp. 1955); Davis v. Auld, 96 Me. 559, 53 Al. 118
(1902); MAss. ANN. LAws, c. 139 §16 (Supp. 1955);
Chase v. Proprietors of Revere House, 232 Mass. 88, 122
N.E. 162 (1919); Mn;N. STAT. §617.34 (1949); State v.
Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95 147 N.W. 953 (1914); NEB.
REv. STAT. §28-911 (1943), State v. Fanning, 96 Neb.
123, 147 N.W. 2 5, Rehearing, 97 Neb. 244, 149 N.W.
413 (1914); OKLA. STAT. ANn. tit 50, §2, 11 (Supp.
1956); Jones v. State, 38 Okla. 218, 132 Pac. 319 (1913);
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4664, 4667 (Supp.
1956), Ex Parte Allison, 99 Tex. 455,90 S.W. 492 (1906).
2 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); People v.
1958]
